A CONTROVERSY OF S.M. KARTOSUWIRYO AND DARUL ISLAM /TENTARA ISLAM INDONESIA REBELLION (1949-1962) WITHIN INDONESIAN HISTORY
Dadan Wiadi (Master candidate of Media and Governance Keio University, Japan)
Indonesia has a long historical time lines, within it, there are some historical times lines are crucial and sensitive and remain in questions about the truth. In a long period of centralistic government the questions were kept in silent. Now, in the reformation era, the spirit to uncover the truth arouses and revealed. Debates and discussion are growing. Recently, there is an idea to re-write the Indonesian History. Two of the most controversy in Indonesian history is Communist Movement in 1965 famous called G30S/PKI and S.M. Kartosuwiryo with his Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (House of Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army) in 1949-1962 famous called DI/TII. Debates about DI/TII mostly in the term of whether .SM.Kartosuwiryo a patriot or just a rebel. Arguments between these two sides have reasonable background and logic view.
The controversy of S.M. Kartosuwiryo and his DI/TII and NII 1949-1962
Dr. Bambang Sulistomo son of an Indonesian hero Bung Tomo, the accuse of rebel to Kartosuwiryo is against history fact, he said,’According to my father testimony, in his pocket book HIMBAUAN (1977), it is said that Hezbollah and Fisabilillah militias refused to withdraw to Yogyakarta as the result of Renville Agreement and chose to stay in West Java region to keep on fight the Dutch. They existence in west Java was under the permission from General Soedirman (Head of Indonesian Army) and Vice President Moh. Hatta’ (“FAKTA Diskriminasi Rezim Soeharto Terhadap Umat Islam”, 1998, hal. xviii).
Moreover, in the book of “Menelusuri Perjalanan Jihad SM Kartosuwiryo” (Juli 1999, hal. xv-xvi), KH Firdaus AN wrote:”…After Renville Agreement between Indonesia and Dutch was signed…., Siliwangi Division had to move out from West Java to Yogyakarta, therefore, West Java was under the rule of Dutch….when General Soedirman welcomed the arrival of Siliwangi Division in Tugu Station Yogyakarta. A reporter from Antara (Indonesian News Agency) accompanies the general in his car….and the reporter asked the general ‘isn’t this strategy lose us? The Supreme Commander answered, ‘I have placed our man/men there’.
KH. Firdaus A.N assumed that “our man” in the term of the general statement was Kartosuwiryo himself. Particularly, to be considered in that time Kartosuwiryo was an important person in the Ministry of Defence of Indonesian Republic. He refused an important office in Defence Ministries, which then held by his close friend Arudji Kartawinata. Therefore, it is can be understood why The Supreme Commander of the Army General Soedirman did not command to annihilate DI/TII….”
On the other hand Himawan Soetanto (Former Head of Indonesian Police Department) in his article in 2007, he writes: Bung Tomo believe that the Kartosuwiryo’s Islamic Indonesian State Proclamation was not based on ideology, but only because of misunderstanding and internal armour conflicts. Islamic State just became a tool to fight.
Furthermore, Himawan Soetanto doubts that Kartosuwiryo was a military assistant of General Soedirman. Himawan’s father was one of the member of The General’s Cabinet (1946-1948), from him Himawan never heard about Kartosuwiryo as an important person in the Defense Ministry or Military Headquarter. Kartosuwiryo was only known as the member of Indonesian National Central Committee (KNIP) and member of West Java Masyumi Commissariat.
In my opinion, for DR. Bambang Sulistomo, Bung Tomo and KH.Firdaus A.N statements logical scientifically emerge questions, first, where is the connection between General Soedirman and Kartosuwiryo? General Soedirman was the Supreme Commander of Indonesian Army which led Defense Ministry, so if Kartosuwiryo refused a position in Defense Ministry, he was just a member of West Java Masyumi Commissariat, and just a member of KNIP, General Soedirman had no reason to contact with him. I more prefer that “our man/men” in term of General’s word was the leader of Hezbollah/Fissabilillah Militia in Eastern West Java, which formally under his command. In that time the leader of Hezbollah/Fissabilillah Militia in Eastern West Java was R. Oni. In fact that before Siliwangi Division flew to Yogyakarta there were several meetings between Siliwangi Division Leaders and Hezbollah/Fissabilillah; for instance; a meeting between Husinsjah and Major Utarya from Siliwangi and R.Oni from Hezbollah/Fissabilillah long before DI/TII Kartosuwiryo was established.
The Second question is: If Kartosuwiryo received direct mission from General Soedirman who was a Supreme Commander of Republic Indonesia Army, Kartosuwiryo had to obey his mission, why then he refused the return of Siliwangi Division to West Java and preferred to establish Indonesian Islamic State (NII). In one occasion, when a messenger from Siliwangi Division Lt. Aang Khunaefi (Former West Java Governor) met Kartosuwiryo and pursued him to re-joint the Republican, Kartosuwiryo said,’…I do not know Republic Indonesia and I do not know Indonesian Army, what I know is Indonesian Islamic State and Indonesian Islamic Army…’. Also when some Islam leaders met him and asked him to re-joint republican, he said,’…perhaps you did not know the Indonesian Islamic State Proclamation (Awwas, Irfan S., 2007, Jejak Jihad SM. Kartosuwiryo, Mengungkap Fakta yang Didustakan (Third Edition))’. Logically, this was a dispute of command and mission deviation. So we need some more study and factual data about this.
In the term of political interest and internal conflict, I agree with Bung Tomo, that Indonesian Islamic State in that time was only a tool of political interest and internal conflict because of mis-communication and mis-understanding and between Islamic vision and secular vision. I also assume that there were combination of conflict between Indonesian Islamic State aspiration and individual political interest of Kartosuwiryo himself. This conflict figured out during his movement. In the previous section I describe that in the first time S.M. Kartosuwiryo with his consistent struggle of Indonesian Islamic State (NII) gained many supported from the Ulamas, especially he was supported by charismatic Ulama of Eastern West Java Kyai Yusuf Tojiri. However, in the following period because of his own ambition, the Ulamas started to withdraw their supported to Kartosuwiryo. Iskandar (2001) identified the reason of why the Ulamas of West Java withdraw their supported was the Constitution Plan (Qaunun Asasi) of NII was not in conformity with Islamic Teachings in Qur’an and Hadist (Prophet Muhammad Words). The terms of un-conformity with Islamic Teachings were 1) the unlimited authority of the Imam (Kartosuwiryo) and his veto rights, 2) to permit every ways or forces to gain the aim, included the collection of funds, which were un-conformity with Islamic teaching to avoid forcing action. And I assume some other parts of this Qaunun Asasi against the Islamic Teachings, instead of permit of every ways to gain the funds, the Imam (Kartosuwiryo) has his right to have certain amount of the funds for his own, moreover, it is rather strange to me that a constitution has to regulate “specific relationship” between man and woman.
Kyai Yusuf Tojiri as a respected and friend of Kartosuwiryo withdrawed his support, Hiroko Hirokoshi in Iskandar (2001) states that in the beginning of 1948, Kartosuwiryo, twice asked Kyai Yusuf Tojiri to proclaim NII, but he refused. As the result of these refusals Pesantren (Indonesian Islamic School) Cipari of Kyai Yusuf Tojiri became the target of Kartosuwiryo’s DI/TII attacks and burned down the pesantren and the library of the pesantren which was full of SI/PSII documents.
From this section I assume that in the beginning S.M. Kartosuwiryo as one of Islamic Leader in Indonesian history was a consistent person who keep on fought for the rights of the Muslims role in the field of Independence Movement, however, his personal ambition made him deviated from the true of Islamic vision and mission for his own aims. Furthermore, I more prefer to acknowledge the role of Kyai Yusuf Tojiri and R. Oni as the key persons of pure DI/TII and NII (1949-1962) aspiration and their contribution to the country, because the aspiration of NII basically from the Ulamas in West Java since the Japanese occupation as a tool to fight against the occupant but it was cancelled when Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesian Independence on August 17, 1945. The General Sudirman did not command to destroy DI/TII, he assumed that DI/TII was a part of Republican strategy to fulfil the enclaves in West Java secretly and protect Republican. If we see the words TII (Islamic Indonesian Army) and it was consist of Islamic Militias as particularly under the General’s command. Why then the Militias turned back against Republican, because in the following years they felt betrayal and left behind by the Republican, as a sample before Siliwangi Division flew to Yogyakarta, two officers from Siliwangi Division Husinsjah and Major Utarya met R. Oni and they promised him to left behind their armours and gave them to R. Oni to support his struggle against Dutch, but in time the armours never appeared (Iskandar, 2001). I just give some additional assumptions to be considered for the discussion and suggest to more research and studies to get the truth about Indonesian History.